

Multidimensional Inequality

Suman Seth

Vanderbilt University & OPHI

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Measurement of Multidimensional Inequality

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- Multiple dimensions vs single-dimension

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 - Basic needs approach

Outline of Today's Lecture

- Basic framework for today's discussion

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 - Pros and cons of these indices

Basic Theoretical Framework

- N persons and D dimensions

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 - $I(X + \lambda) = I(X)$ where $\lambda > 0$

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- Decomposability (DECOM). Overall inequality can be expressed as a general function of the subgroup means, population sizes and inequality values
 - For two groups of size N_1 and N_2 such that $N_1 + N_2 = N$, $I(X) = f\left(I(X_{N_1}), I(X_{N_2}), \bar{X}_{N_1}, \bar{X}_{N_2}, N_1, N_2\right)$, where \bar{X}_{N_1} and \bar{X}_{N_2} are the mean vectors of X_{N_1} and X_{N_2}

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- Subgroup Consistency (SUBCON). If the inequality of one subgroup rises and the other is unaltered, then overall inequality rise
- Continuity (CONTN). $I(H)$ does not change abruptly due to a change in any of the elements in H

Axioms Sensitive to Inequality Across Persons

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- Correlation Increasing Transfer (CIT). Y is derived from X by a correlation increasing transfer if, for some rows n' and n'' , $n' < n''$, $y_{n'} = x_{n'} \wedge x_{n''}$, $y_{n''} = x_{n'} \vee x_{n''}$, and $y_n = x_n$ for all $n \notin \{n', n''\}$, where $x \wedge y = (\min\{x_{n'1}, y_{n'1}\}, \dots, \min\{x_{n''1}, y_{n''1}\})$ and $x \vee y = (\max\{x_{n'1}, y_{n'1}\}, \dots, \max\{x_{n''1}, y_{n''1}\})$ (Boland and Proschan 1988)

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- Note - For indices with two stage aggregation approach, if the aggregation takes place first across persons and then across dimensions, indices do not satisfy CIT

Absolute vs. relative inequality index

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- A *relative inequality index* must satisfy *scale invariance axiom* besides other essential axioms

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- Inequality increases with correlation when $\alpha < \beta$

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- Create $\mathbf{h} = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)$

- Then $\bar{U} = [\mu_{-2} (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)]^{0.5} = 0.71$. $\bar{W} = 0.71$

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- Problems: role of inequality aversion parameter is not clear

Maasoumi Index (1986, 1999)

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- The second stage is a generalized entropy

$$I_M = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\alpha(1-\alpha)} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^n \left(1 - \left(\frac{U_n}{\bar{S}} \right)^\alpha \right) & \text{for } \alpha \neq 0, 1. \\ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^n \log \left(\frac{\bar{S}}{U_n} \right) & \text{for } \alpha = 0 \\ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{U_n}{\bar{S}} \log \left(\frac{U_n}{\bar{S}} \right) & \text{for } \alpha = 1 \end{cases}$$

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- $\bar{S} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N U_n$

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$$I_M = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\alpha(1-\alpha)} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^n \left(1 - \left(\frac{U_n}{\bar{S}} \right)^\alpha \right) & \text{for } \alpha \neq 0, 1. \\ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^n \log \left(\frac{\bar{S}}{U_n} \right) & \text{for } \alpha = 0 \\ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{U_n}{\bar{S}} \log \left(\frac{U_n}{\bar{S}} \right) & \text{for } \alpha = 1 \end{cases}$$

- $\bar{S} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N U_n$
- Problems: Not sure what restrictions on parameter satisfies different transfer properties

Tsui Index (1995, 1999)

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$$I_{TRI} = 1 - \left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \left(\prod_{d=1}^D \left(\frac{x_{nd}}{\mu_d} \right)^{a_d} \right) \right]^{1 / \sum_{i=1}^D a_d}$$

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- Problem: Tsui parameters are not interpretable.

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Multidimensional Generalized Gini Indices

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 - Second stage: generalized mean across dimensions.

$$I_{GW} = \mu_{\beta}(U_1, \dots, U_D) \text{ for } \beta \leq 1$$

- Limitation: the order of aggregation makes I_{GW} to be not strictly sensitive to correlation among dimensions

- Decancq and Lugo (2008)

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- Reversed order of aggregation
 - First stage: generalized mean across dimensions.

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- Second stage: Gini social evaluation function, which is generalized Gini index.

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